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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
United States Constitution Amendment V.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
New York Constitution Article I Section 6:
[I]n any trial in any court whatever the party accused
shall be allowed to appear.., with counsel ....
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Ramos'
(decided October 22, 2002)
Hilberto Ramos was convicted of murder in the second
degree, burglary in the first degree, and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree.2 Following his conviction, Ramos
appealed to the appellate division, arguing that the detectives'
delay in his arraignment for the purpose of obtaining a confession
violated his New York State constitutional right to counsel. The
appellate division held that Ramos' right to counsel claim could be
raised on appeal even though it was not preserved at trial.4
However, that court declined to reach the merits of the case
because "the record was not sufficient to permit appellate review,"
and therefore affirmed Ramos' conviction.
5
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court, however on different grounds. 6 The Court of
Appeals determined that, "a delay in arraignment for the purpose
99 N.Y.2d 27, 780 N.E.2d 506, 750 N.Y.S.2d 821 (2002).
2 Id. at 31, 780 N.E.2d at 508, 750 N.Y.S. at 823.
3 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear... with counsel ......
4 People v. Ramos, 282 A.D.2d 623, 723 N.Y.S.2d 382 (2d Dep't 2001).
5 Id.
6 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 32, 780 N.E.2d at 508-09, 750 N.Y.S. at 823-24.
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of further police questioning does not establish a deprivation of the
State constitutional right to counsel." 7 The court further noted that
Ramos' claim involved only a violation of New York's Criminal
Procedure Law Section 140.20.8 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the appellate division's order and stated, the defendant
"may not convert an unpreserved statutory claim into a
constitutional right-to-counsel claim--and thus ain appellate
review-by merely labeling the claim constitutional."
The three offenses resulted when police found a woman
shot to death in the bathtub of her home.10  Upon further
investigation, the police became aware that the victim and
defendant were romantically involved." After questioning Ramos
about his whereabouts on the evening prior to the victim's death,
there were several inconsistencies in his statement, and therefore,
the police took the defendant to the precinct for further
questioning. 12 At the precinct, Ramos was read his Miranda rights
and waived his right to counsel. 13 Ramos admitted that he was at
the victim's home the previous night, but denied any involvement
in the crime. 14  Detectives also questioned Ramos' present
girlfriend, who told them that the defendant had gone to her house
in the early morning asking for clothes, and stated that "he
[Ramos] 'messed up' and that the victim was 'gone." ' 15 Based on
7 Id. at 37, 780 N.E.2d at 513, 750 N.Y.S. at 828.
8 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 2002) provides in pertinent part:
Upon arresting a person without a warrant, a police officer,
after performing without unnecessary delay all recording,
fingerprinting and other preliminary police duties required in
the particular case, must except as otherwise provided in this
section, without unnecessary delay bring the arrested person or
cause him to be brought before a local criminal court and file
therewith an appropriate accusatory instrument charging him
with the offense or offenses in question." This section is also
commonly referred to as the "prompt-arraignment statute.
9 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 37, 780 N.E.2d at 513, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
'0 Id. at 30, 99 N.Y.2d at 507, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
11 Id.
12 id.
13 Id. at 30, 780 N.E.2d at 507, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
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the information obtained, and blood found on Ramos' shoes, the
police officers arrested him.' 6
The following day two detectives interviewed Ramos and
informed him of his Miranda rights.' 7 Ramos again waived his
right to counsel. 18 In the ensuing interview, Ramos fully confessed
to his involvement in the crime by submitting a written
confession.' 9 Ramos was arraigned shortly after the completion of
the interview.
20
Ramos appealed his conviction, arguing for the first time
that the detectives purposely delayed his arraignment in order to
obtain a confession, and that this delay violated his New York
State constitutional right to counsel. 2' He brought to the courtis
attention the testimony of Detective Toole, the arresting officer,
who testified on cross-examination that she stopped the booking
process about two hours and forty minutes after she arrested
Ramos because she suspected Ramos of having more knowledge
about the crime.22 Detective Toole further testified that she wanted
Detective Sica to interview the defendant because he was "more
experienced at conducting interrogations. 23 Ramos argued that
the delay in his arraignment caused by Detective Toole for further
questioning by Detective Sica violated his New York State
constitutional right to counsel.24 The appellate division held that
Ramos could raise this issue on appeal even though it was
unpreserved at trial, but ultimately affirmed his conviction on
different grounds. 25  However, the Court of Appeals held that
Ramos' claim involved only a violation of the prompt-arraignment
statute, a claim that Ramos failed to preserve at trial, rendering the





'9 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 31, 780 N.E.2d at 508, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
20 Id. It is important to note in this particular case that approximately 15 hours




24 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 31, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 823, 780 N.E.2d at 508.
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Before commencing an analysis of this case, the Court of
Appeals recognized the right of a criminal defendant to raise the
right to counsel on appeal even if it was not preserved at trial.27
The court referred to its holding in People v. Kinchen,28 where "a
claimed deprivation of the state constitutional right to counsel may
be raised on appeal, notwithstanding that the issue was not
preserved by having been specifically raised in a suppression
motion or at trial.",29 Despite this recognition, the court declared
that Ramos' claim was not a state constitutional right to counsel
claim; rather, it was a violation of the prompt-arraignment statute
that must be preserved in order to have appellate review.3" The
Court of Appeals rendered Ramos' claim not reviewable because
he failed to preserve that claim at trial. 31 Even though the claim
was not reviewable, the Court of Appeals discussed why an undue
delay in arraignment does not give rise to a constitutional right to
counsel, characterizing this right as a "cherished principle"
32
worthy of the "highest degree of judicial vigilance."
33
The Court of Appeals discussed two situations where the
constitutional right to counsel attaches. 34 The court stated, "when
formal judicial proceedings begin, whether or not the defendant
has actually retained or requested a lawyer" the right to counsel
attaches. 35 Additionally, the right also attaches "when an
uncharged individual 'has actually retained a lawyer in the matter
at issue, or while in custody, has requested a lawyer in that
27 Id. at 32, 780 N.E.2d at 508, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
2' 60 N.Y.2d 772, 457 N.E.2d 786, 469 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1983).
29 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 30, 780 N.E.2d at 507, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (citing,
Kinchen, 60 N.Y.2d at 773-74, 457 N.E.2d at 787, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 681).
30 Id. at 30, 780 N.E.2d at 507, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
31 id.
32 Id. at 32, 780 N.E.2d at 509, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (citing People v. West, 81
N.Y.2d 370, 373, 615 N.E.2d 968, 970, 599 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (1993); People
v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705
(1991); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160-161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614-15, 412
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978)).
33 Id. (citing People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363,
424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980)).
34 Id.
35 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 32, 780 N.E.2d at 508, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
[Vol 19286
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matter. 36  The court characterized these two circumstances as
being similar to those under the Fifth 37 and Sixth Amendments to
the Federal Constitution, 38  but noted that "New York's
constitutional right to counsel jurisprudence developed
'independent' of its Federal counterpart and offers broader
protections." 40 The Court determined that Ramos' right to counsel
did not attach under either circumstance because when he
confessed, judicial proceedings were not underway and he had not
retained or requested an attorney.4 ' Further, the court highlighted
that Ramos waived his right to counsel on two separate
occasions.42
The Court of Appeals analyzed the cases that Ramos used
to support his assertion that the constitutional right to counsel arose
when the officers delayed his arraignment to obtain an
"uncounseled confession." 43  The court examined People v.
36 Id. (quoting West, 81 N.Y.2d at 373-74, 615 N.E.2d at 970, 599 N.Y.S.2d at
486).37 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be held for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
38 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
39 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 33, 780 N.E.2d at 509, 750 N.Y.S. at 824 (citing Settles,
46 N.Y.2d at 160-61, 412, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614-15 N.Y.S.2d 874).
40 Id. It is important to note that Ramos made no claim under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and did not cite any federal cases
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Wilson, 4 where the defendant argued that his inculpatory
statements that were made without the presence of counsel, should
be suppressed.45 The Wilson court struck down the defendant's
claim holding that "we cannot agree with defendant's argument
that because he was physically in police custody awaiting
arraignment his right to counsel had attached, and no decision in
our court so holds. 46 However, Ramos claimed that the court had
left open a distinguishing factor when it further stated that the
delay in arraignment was not "calculated to deprive defendant of
his right to counsel. 47
Another case Ramos relied on and the Court of Appeals
discussed, is People v. Ortlieb.48 In Ortlieb, the defendant argued
that his statements should have been suppressed at trial because the
police postponed his arraignment in order to deprive him of his
right to counsel.49 The court concluded that there "was no
unnecessary delay under CPL 140.20 (1)"50and as a result, the
suppression was properly denied. 51  The Court of Appeals
examined Ramos' contentions in light of these cases and firmly
stated that the court "has never held that a deliberate delay of
arraignment for the purpose of obtaining a confession triggers the
state constitutional right to counsel.",52 The court further stated that
"56 N.Y.2d 692, 436 N.E.2d 1321, 451 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1982).
41 Id. at 694, 436 N.E.2d at 1322, 451 N.Y.S. at 719.
46id.
47 Id.
48 84 N.Y.2d 989, 646 N.E.2d 803, 622 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1994).
49 Id. at 990, 646 N.E.2d at 804, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 502. Defendant was arrested
for stabbing his former girlfriend to death. Id. at 990, 646 N.E.2d at 804, 622
N.Y.S.2d at 502. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights upon arrest and
again at the station house but signed a written statement confessing to the crime.
Id. Five hours later, the defendant was arraigned after police questioning, and
defendant argued that he was entitled to suppression on the ground that
arraignment was postponed for the sole purpose of depriving him of the right to
counsel. Id. at 990, 646 N.E.2d at 804, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The court found
that there was no "unnecessary delay" making the suppression properly denied.
Id.
50 See supra note 8.
"' Ortlieb, 84 N.Y.2d at 989, 646 N.E.2d at 804, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
52 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 34, 780 N.E.2d at 825, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
288 [Vol 19
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a deliberate delay bears on the voluntariness of the confession and
"is a factor to be considered in that regard.,
53
The Court of Appeals determined that Ramos'
constitutional right to counsel had "never attached" because when
there is no request for an attorney, the right to counsel attaches
only when formal judicial proceedings commence. 54 Moreover,
the court observed that there was no case law to support that this
right should attach at the point Ramos suggested. 55 The Court of
Appeals also stated a delay in arraignment does not give rise to a
right to counsel claim in that both the federal and state laws
mandate that Miranda warnings are to be given to an individual
who is arrested and brought into police custody.56 The Court of
Appeals reasoned that Ramos was free to invoke his right to
counsel but failed to do so. 5 ' Additionally, the court noted that a
delay in arraignment is a factor to be considered in determining
whether a confession is involuntary requiring suppression, but is
not a dispositive factor leading to automatic suppression of
statements made during a delayed arraignment. Moreover, the
court observed, "except in cases of involuntariness, a delay in
arraignment, even if prompted by a desire for further police
questioning, does not warrant suppression."
59
The final contention of the Court of Appeals is that the
prompt-arraignment statute does not automatically create a right to
counsel by its terms or by inference.60 The court stated that under
this statute, a person arrested without a warrant must be processed
and brought before a criminal court with an accusatory instrument
53 Id. (citing People v. Hopkins, 58 N.Y.2d 1079, 108i, 449 N.E.2d 419, 420,
462 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (1983); People v. Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861, 863, 400
N.E.2d 293, 294, 424 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1979); People v. Dairsaw, 46 N.Y.2d
739, 740, 386 N.E.2d 249, 249, 413 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (1978)).
14 Id. at 34-35, 780 N.E.2d at 511, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 34, 780 N.E.2d at 825, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)). Under Miranda, if during the course of police
interrogation, a person chooses to remain silent or invokes his right to counsel,
all questioning must cease. Id. at 473-474.
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charging him with the crime "without unnecessary delay."61 In the
event of an unnecessary delay, remedies are available to
defendants, which include release from custody and possible
suppression of evidence if the confession is deemed to be
involuntary.62 Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that CPL
140.20, which parallels Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure63 is meant to protect against "unlawful confinement and
assure that persons accused are advised of their rights and given
notice of the crime or crimes charged., 64  As such, the court
characterized Ramos' effort to change CPL 140.20 into a
constitutional claim of right to counsel as "misguided" because the
right to a timely arraignment is "grounded neither in [the Court of
Appeal's] jurisprudence nor (in the case of the federal rule) in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment." 65
In support of its conclusion, the Court of Appeals discussed
several reasons for declining to adopt Ramos' position. First, if the
court were to adopt Ramos' position, any time there was an alleged
unnecessary delay in arraignment, a right to counsel claim could be
raised for the first time on appeal. 66 The court stated that adopting
this position would, "skew our preservation of jurisprudence"
because a non-preserved right to counsel claim has only been
permitted when there has been a clear constitutional violation.67
61 id.
62 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 35, 780 N.E.2d at 825, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 510. At this
point in the Court of Appeal's analysis, the court took note of the Supreme
Court's findings that an accused in custody has a federal constitutional right to a
prompt probable-cause determination and that this right is "grounded in the
Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures, not the right to
counsel under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments." Id.
63 FED. RULES OF CRIM. P. rule 5(a) (2003) provides: "An officer making an
arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest
without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available federal magistrate judge ... if a person arrested
without a warrant is brought before a magistrate judge, a complaint, satisfying
the probable cause requirements of Rule 4(a), shall be promptly filed."
64 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 36, 780 N.E.2d at 512, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 37, 780 N.E.2d at 513, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
67 Id. (citing People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d
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Ramos' conviction was properly determined because there was
nothing on the record in Ramos' case showing a clear violation of
his constitutional right to counsel.6 s Furthermore, the court had
determined that a delay in arraignment does not automatical y
evidence a violation of his constitutional right to counsel. 9
Additionally, the court stated that if it were to allow Ramos and
other defendants to raise claims such as this for the first time on
appeal, the appellate review would be difficult and "it would also
seriously prejudice the People."
70
Furthermore, Ramos did not assert any violation of his
Sixth Amendment71 right under the United States Constitution and
cited no federal cases to support his allegations.72 In fact, as the
Court of Appeals mentioned, there was an identical argument made
by another defendant in Holmes v. Scully 73 that was struck down
by a federal court. 74 In Holmes, the defendant was convicted in
New York State court of burglary in the first and second degree.
75
The defendant appealed to the appellate division and that court
affirmed his conviction, without issuing an opinion.76 The
defendant alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel; that the trial
court should have suppressed certain evidence obtained when the
state "illegally and unlawfully" delayed his arraignment in
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; that this
68 id.
69 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 37, 780 N.E.2d at 513, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
70 Id. The prejudice the court refers to here is that the People would have to
show other reasons for delay in arraignment, "such as the need to continue the
investigation, examine the crime scene, gather the accused's pedigree
information, acquire the accused's criminal history or otherwise explain the
,rocedures that are involved before a defendant is arraigned." Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72 Id. at 33, 780 N.E.2d at 509, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
73 706 F.Supp. 195 (1989).
74 Ramos, 99 N.Y.2d at 33, 780 N.E.2d at 510, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
75 Holmes, 706 F. Supp. at 196. The defendant was convicted of burglary in the
first and second degree and was sentenced as a second violent felony offender to
consecutive prison terms. Defendant argued that evidence obtained when the
state illegally and detained him without arraignment should have been
suppressed. The court determined that, it could not review the inmate's claim
stemming from the delayed arraignment absent a showing of an "unconscionable
breakdown in the state's review process." Id. at 201.76 People v. Holmes, 103 A.D.2d 1047, 479 N.Y.S.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1984).
2003
9
Lupinacci: Right to Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
TOURO LAW REVIEW
delay in arraignment "was tantamount to an illegal and unlawful
detention" and resulted in the acquisition of incriminating evidence
by coercion and/or by forestalling the petitioner's right to
assistance of counsel."
The court rejected the petitioner's Sixth Amendment
argument that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel
because a delay in arraignment does not automatically justify
habeas corpus relief, unless the inculpatory statements resulted
from police coercion.78 Additionally, the court said, "the right to
counsel only comes into existence 'at or after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment."' 79 Therefore, the court determined that a "mere
delay" in arraignment is not in and of itself a violation of the
constitutional right to counsel. 80
The language used in the Holmes court mirrors the
language of several Supreme Court decisions.8 1  In Kirby v.
Illinois,8 2 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches at post-indictment pre-trial line-ups, and refused to extend
this right to identifications made prior to prosecution. In Kirby, the
defendant was identified before he was arrested for robbery and the
Court admitted pre-indictment identification even though there was
no attorney present.83 The Court reasoned -that, "an accused is
77 id.
" Id. at 203.
79 Id. (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
'0 Id. at 203.
81 See e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (finding that, in all cases, "a
person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been imitated against
him."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
82 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
83 Id. at 684-86. Defendant was arrested for robbery and taken to the police
station. The victim of a robbery identified defendant as the perpetrator at the
police station. The same victim who testified at to the police station also made
an in-court identification of defendant. The Court found that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel did not extend to the identification that took place
because it was "before the commencement of any prosecution." Id.
[Vol 19292
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entitled to counsel at any 'critical stage of the prosecution,' and
that a post-indictment lineup is such a 'critical stage.' ' '84 As such,
the Court declined to adopt an exclusionary rule for testimony
dealing with out of court identifications that take place before the
"commencement of any prosecution." 85
Likewise, in Massiah v. United States,86 the Court held that
the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment protection when
incriminating statements were used as evidence at his.trial, which
were from deliberately elicited by federal agents after his
indictment and in the absence of an attorney.87 In Massiah, after
the defendant had been indicted for federal narcotics violations, he
retained counsel and pleaded not guilty.88 A co-defendant invited
Massiah into his car to discuss illegal matters that pertained to the
case. 89 Massiah was unaware that his co-conspirator was
cooperating with the government and that the damaging statements
made during this conversation were being transmitted to a federal
agent. 90 The Court found that the secret taping of the conversation,
"from and after the finding of the indictment, without the
protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravened the
basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of the criminal cause and
the fundamental rights of [Massiah]." 91
It is clear when comparing the federal court decision in
Holmes and the Supreme Court decisions with the New York State
court decision in Ramos, that the treatment of a delay in
arraignment is handled in a similar manner. In both situations,
may it be under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or under the New York State Constitution, the right to
counsel does not automatically attach.92 The right to counsel will
attach, "only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings
4 Id. at 690 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968)).
85 Id.
86 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
87 Id. at 206.
88 Id. at 201.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 203.
91 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205 (citing People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175
N.E.2d 445,448, 215 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (1961).
92 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
2003
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have been initiated against the [defendant]. ' 9  Furthermore, it
appears that neither the federal courts nor the states courts will
allow the right to counsel to attach earlier then what the courts
have thus held. Therefore, in accordance with the Ramos decision,
a criminal defendant in New York has a right to counsel when
formal judicial proceedings are underway. Additionally, a mere
delay in arraignment will not give rise to a constitutional claim of
right to counsel; rather, if the defendant so chooses, he or she
should file a claim that the police violated the prompt-arraignment
statute. Furthermore, it is important to raise this claim at trial in
order for it to be reviewed on appeal.
Brooke Lupinacci
93 See, e.g., Coleman, 399 U.S. at 1.
[Vol 19
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